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LOSING THE GAME: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
BROWN V. ENTERTAINMENT MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION 
DECISION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS IN THE AREA OF 
“INTERACTIVE” VIDEO GAMES 
There are reasons to suspect that the experience of playing violent video 
games just might be very different from reading a book, listening to the radio, 
or watching a movie or a television show.1 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 27, 2004, seventeen-year-old Warren Leblanc of Leicester, 
England, lured his friend, fourteen-year-old Stefan Pakeerah, to an area of 
town commonly known as “The Dumps.”2 Leblanc was armed with a knife and 
claw hammer.3 In a matter of minutes, Leblanc brutally murdered Pakeerah, 
inflicting over fifty separate injuries.4 Subsequent analysis of Pakeerah’s body 
revealed that he had been struck so hard with the claw hammer that his skull 
had been fractured multiple times, and the knife had been driven so deeply into 
his body that he suffered extensive kidney and liver damage.5 
Soon after Pakeerah’s death, his parents called for a ban on violent video 
games, and, in particular, the controversial game Manhunt.6 Pakeerah’s mother 
heard that Leblanc was “obsessed” with the violent game and blamed 
Leblanc’s fixation with the game for the manner in which he carried out the 
brutal murder.7 Pakeerah’s father stated outside of court that “the way Warren 
committed the murder is how the game (Manhunt) is set out—killing people 
using weapons like hammers and knives. There is some connection between 
the game and what he has done.”8 Although the judge in Leblanc’s case 
proclaimed that Leblanc alone was responsible for the grisly murder,9 the 
 
 1. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 2. Game Blamed for Hammer Murder, BBC NEWS (July 29, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/uk_news/england/leicestershire/3934277.stm. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Game Blamed for Hammer Murder, supra note 2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lee Glendinning, Gang Culture Blamed as ‘Manhunt’ Killer is Sentenced to Life, THE 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 4, 2004, at 10. The article quotes Judge Michael Stokes in his sentencing of 
Leblanc, where he stated “[o]ne thing is clear—you and you alone were responsible for this . . . .” 
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incident nevertheless prompted some major retailers to pull Manhunt from 
their shelves.10 
Manhunt was released in 2003, and it was immediately criticized for its 
graphically violent content.11 A review of the game (giving the game an 8.3 out 
of 10) noted that the game “unflinchingly depicts intense graphic violence.”12 
Players assume the identity of James Earl Cash, a death row inmate who 
narrowly escapes capital punishment.13 For the remainder of the game, Cash 
performs a series of increasingly brutal murders at the behest of his sponsor, 
Starkweather, who captures the grisly scenes for his snuff films.14 Cash is 
encouraged to continually vary the method used for the murders, such as 
driving glass shards into victims’ eyes or forcing plastic bags over his victims’ 
heads until they start to twitch and suffocate.15 Blood gushes freely in the 
game, at times even soaking the screen, and the murders are accompanied by 
the screams and gurgling noises of the victims, prompting the review to warn 
that the “executions sound as sickening as they look.”16 The more gruesomely 
the murder is executed, the more Starkweather offers praise.17 The review 
notes that one will not tire of the explicit murders—“if you can stomach them 
in the first place.”18 
The outcry over the shockingly violent content of the game was no 
surprise, even to its own developers.19 A former employee of Rockstar (the 
company that developed Manhunt and other controversial games such as 
Grand Theft Auto) posted on his blog that “there was almost a mutiny at the 
company over the game.”20 Jeff Williams claimed that many of the Rockstar 
employees wanted no part of the game, because its unyielding violence made it 
different from the controversial games the company had released in the past.21 
Williams stated: “Manhunt, though, just made us all feel icky. It was all about 
 
Id. 
 10. Retailer Pulls ‘Murder’ Video Game, CNN WORLD (July 30, 2004), http://articles. 
cnn.com/2004-07-30/world/uk.manhunt.storeban_1_violent-video-rockstar-games-murder?_s= 
PM:WORLD. 
 11. Douglas C. Perry, Manhunt, IGN (Nov. 18, 2003), http://ps2.ign.com/articles/440/4408 
87p1.html. 
 12. Description of Manhunt taken from: Greg Kasavin, Manhunt, GAMESPOT (Apr. 20, 
2004), http://www.gamespot.com/manhunt/reviews/manhunt-review-6083971/?page=1. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Kasavin, supra note 12. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Matt Cundy, Manhunt Nearly Caused a “Mutiny” at Rockstar, GAMESRADAR (July 26, 
2007), http://www.gamesradar.com/manhunt-nearly-caused-a-mutiny-at-rockstar/. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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the violence, and it was realistic violence. We all knew there was no way we 
could explain away that game. There was no way to rationalize it. We were 
crossing a line.”22 
Games such as Manhunt led legislatures to push for more stringent violent 
video game restrictions, fueled by parents such as Mrs. Pakeerah.23 As an 
example, the 110th Congress introduced legislation attempting to regulate the 
sale or rental of “adult-rated” video games to minors.24 However the bill was 
never passed due to First Amendment concerns.25 The rationale behind this bill 
(and a flurry of similar legislation) was that violence could be portrayed in a 
manner that exempted it from First Amendment protection, at least with 
respect to minors.26 In opposition to the growing amount of legislation against 
violent video games, however, many critics countered that these laws were a 
violation of the First Amendment right to free speech.27 
Over the past twenty years, a number of lower courts have grappled with 
the issue of whether or not video games qualify for First Amendment 
protection.28 Assuming First Amendment protection even applies to video 
games, are all video games worthy of protection, or do some games (such as 
those that are as graphically violent as Manhunt) fall outside of this protection? 
Does the answer change when minors are playing the games? Can a law 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Petitioners’ Brief at 34, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) 
(No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 2787546 (noting that California is one of nine states/municipalities to 
pass laws restricting minors’ access to violent video games). 
 24. Video Games Ratings Enforcement Act, H.R. 5990, 110th Cong. (2008). The proposed 
bill essentially attempted to legislate the Entertainment Software Ratings Board (ESRB) 
voluntary ratings system. 
 25. Video Games, USLEGAL.COM, http://entertainmentlaw.uslegal.com/censorship/ratings/ 
video-games/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
 26. Indeed, Petitioners’ Reply Brief in Brown states “just as with sex, violent material can be 
depicted in a manner that falls outside the protection of the First Amendment in respect to minors. 
This is certainly true in the context of video games.” Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 9, Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 4034925. To support this 
point, the Brief cites a description of Manhunt, pulled from a “Top 10” list of the most violent 
video games. Id. Manhunt was ranked number three, due to its “heinous acts of murder as part of 
a sadistic form of entertainment.” Id. Those acts include “[d]ecapitation, steel-object-to-the-brain 
impaling, and even the ability to jam a sickle up an unsuspecting victim’s ass . . . .” Id. 
 27. Adam Cohen, California’s Misguided War on Violent Video Games, Case Study, TIME 
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2027692,00.html. 
 28. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that the violent video games did not qualify for the First Amendment obscenity 
exception); Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 
2003) (holding that a law prohibiting minors from playing violent video games without their 
parents’ consent was a violation of the First Amendment); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. 
Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that violent video games were entitled to 
First Amendment protection the same as any other art form). 
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targeting video games be upheld when it is specifically directed at violent, not 
sexually explicit, content? 
In June 2011, the Supreme Court ruled on the interplay between First 
Amendment protection and violent video game legislation.29 The case, Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, was a response to a California statute 
prohibiting the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors.30 The statute, 
section 1746 of the California Civil Code, specifically stated that “a person 
may not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video game 
to a minor” unless “the violent video game is sold or rented to a minor by the 
minor’s parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or legal guardian.”31 The definitional 
portion of the statute defines a “violent video game” as one in which “the 
range of options available to a player include killing, maiming, dismembering, 
or sexually assaulting an image of a human being.”32 Violations of the act were 
punishable by a civil fine of up to $1,000.33 
Almost immediately after the statute passed, the Entertainment Merchants 
Association (a not-for-profit international trade association organization 
 
 29. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 30. Id. at 2732. 
 31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1 (2009). 
 32. Id. § 1746. The portion of the statute defining violent video games fully states: 
Violent video game” means a video game in which the range of options available to a 
player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a 
human being, if those acts are depicted in the game in a manner that does either of the 
following: 
(A) Comes within all of the following descriptions: 
(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a 
deviant or morbid interest of minors. 
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is 
suitable for minors. 
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors. 
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious injury upon images of human beings or 
characters with substantially human characteristics in a manner which is especially 
heinous, cruel, or depraved in that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to the 
victim.  
Id. 
 33. Id. § 1746.3. The full text of the penalty portion of the statute states: 
Any person who violates any provision of this title shall be liable in an amount of up to 
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or a lesser amount as determined by the court. However, 
this liability shall not apply to any person who violates those provisions if he or she is 
employed solely in the capacity of a salesclerk or other, similar position and he or she 
does not have an ownership interest in the business in which the violation occurred and is 
not employed as a manager in that business. 
Id. 
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representing both the video game and software industries)34 filed a pre-
enforcement challenge to the Act, alleging that it violated the First 
Amendment.35 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
agreed with the Association that the Act was in violation of the First 
Amendment, and the court preliminarily enjoined its enforcement.36 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.37 The Supreme Court then 
granted certiorari.38 The stage was set for the Supreme Court to address the 
contours of First Amendment protection as it may apply to violent video 
games. 
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the decision of both lower courts 
and found the law to be in violation of the First Amendment.39 The Court first 
noted that video games as a whole qualify for First Amendment protection, and 
while there are limited recognized exceptions of unprotected speech, this law 
could not be justified under one of those exceptions.40 Furthermore, since there 
was not a compelling reason that could legitimate the First Amendment 
 
 34. ABOUT EMA, http://www.entmerch.org/about-ema/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2012) (“The Entertainment Merchants Association (EMA) is the not-for-profit international trade 
association dedicated to advancing the interests of the $35 billion home entertainment industry. 
EMA-member companies operate approximately 35,000 retail outlets in the U.S. and 45,000 
around the world that sell and/or rent DVDs, computer and console video games, and digitally 
distributed versions of these products. Membership comprises the full spectrum of retailers (from 
single-store specialists to multi-line mass merchants, and both brick and mortar and online 
stores), distributors, the home video divisions of major and independent motion picture studios, 
video game publishers, and other related businesses that constitute and support the home 
entertainment industry. EMA was established in April 2006 through the merger of the Video 
Software Dealers Association (VSDA) and the Interactive Entertainment Merchants Association 
(IEMA).”). EMA’s proclaimed mission is: “To protect the right to sell and rent entertainment 
products and content; promote the sale and rental of entertainment products and content; and 
provide a forum for all those engaged in the sale, rental and/or commercial delivery of home 
entertainment to consumers.” Id. 
 35. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 36. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp 2d 1034, 1048 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007). The court held that although the Association had not demonstrated that they would 
likely succeed in arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, they had proven that they 
were likely to succeed in arguing that the statute was a violation of minor’s First Amendment 
rights. Id. 
 37. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 565 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009). 
The Ninth Circuit held that violent video games did not fall under the legal definition of 
“obscenity.” Id. Furthermore, the state had not demonstrated that there was a compelling interest 
to validate the law; the court further noted that even if a compelling interest had been 
demonstrated, the statute was not narrowly tailored enough to serve that interest. Id. 
 38. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. 
 39. Id. at 2742. 
 40. Id. at 2733. 
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imposition, and, regardless, the statute was not narrowly tailored enough to 
serve that interest, the Court invalidated the statute.41 
This Note will first trace the development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, focusing specifically on First Amendment protection as applied 
to evolving technologies and violent video games. It will then detail the 
Court’s conclusion in Brown that violent video games do qualify for First 
Amendment protection and should not be exempt due to a traditional 
unprotected speech exception.42 Next, it will explain the positions of the 
concurrence and two dissents, focusing specifically on the criticism of the 
majority’s quick dismissal of the argument that the interactive nature of video 
games presents special First Amendment concerns. Finally, this Note will 
conclude by surveying contemporary scholarly opinions to analyze whether the 
majority erred in essentially disregarding the argument that the interactivity of 
video games mandates that they be subject to a different First Amendment 
analysis, and by questioning whether the Court’s decision will remain relevant 
as video game technology continues to improve. 
I.  HISTORY 
A. Basic First Amendment Protection Principles Regulating Artistic 
Expression 
The First Amendment, in full, states: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”43 For purposes of First Amendment doctrine, the critical language 
is “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”44 Courts 
have consistently interpreted this provision to mean that the government 
cannot restrict a type of expression based upon its subject matter or content.45 
Courts continually grapple with the idea of what is and is not “protected 
speech” and how new categories of expression may broaden or narrow that 
definition.46 
The principle of not restricting an expression based upon its subject matter 
or content also applies when the expression in question is an artistic one. In 
 
 41. Id. at 2741. 
 42. Id. at 2738. 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (noting that the First 
Amendment means that the government cannot restrict expression because of “its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content”). 
 46. Id. at 574, 594–95 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., for instance, the Court 
struck down a provision of the Telecommunications Act that imposed content-
based restrictions on television programmers.47 The portion of the statute in 
question required cable television operators with channels primarily focused on 
sexually-oriented programming to either “fully scramble” or otherwise block 
those channels, or limit their transmission to the hours when children were 
unlikely to be viewing (between 10 PM and 6 AM).48 In reaching the 
conclusion that this provision was invalid, the Court noted that one of the 
foundational principles behind First Amendment doctrine is the fact that the 
content of the expression should never affect whether or not the First 
Amendment protects it, since it is not the government’s place to determine 
what is worthy of societal value.49 Instead, “esthetic and moral judgments 
about art and literature . . . are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree.”50 Thus, it is inappropriate for the government to 
restrict an expression based solely upon its content, regardless of whether the 
expression is artistic or non-artistic. 
B. Examples of Unprotected Speech 
Although on the whole the government cannot curtail free speech, there are 
very limited areas in which the government may restrict expression. As the 
Supreme Court has explicitly stated, “[I]t is well understood that the right of 
free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”51 In 
certain limited exceptions, expressions may be prohibited when conflicting 
interests outweigh the right to speech.52 Although there may be various reasons 
why courts will decline First Amendment protection for a particular 
 
 47. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826–27 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 806. 
 49. Id. at 818. 
 50. Id. The court rejected the idea that it is the government’s place to restrict messages based 
on content, stating: 
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, including esthetic and 
moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the 
Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the 
Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority. Technology 
expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution is we assume 
that Government is best positioned to make these choices for us. 
Id. 
 51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
 52. Id. at 571–72 (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which has never been though to raise any Constitutional 
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
“fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.”). 
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expression, three recognized areas of unprotected speech include incitement, 
fighting words, and obscenity.53 
The justification for restricting expression based on incitement is detailed 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court stated that free speech 
expression can be curtailed in situations where the expression is “directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”54 However, incitement is a much higher standard than merely 
advocating a disturbing or violent position; to fully reach the level of 
incitement that is unprotected by the First Amendment, the speech must 
essentially be preparing a group for violent action and encouraging the group 
to take that violent action.55 Thus, the key word in an incitement analysis is 
“imminent.” If speech is advancing a public disturbance or inciting people to 
action, then it can be curtailed to a certain extent as a protection mechanism. 
Another recognized category of unprotected expression is fighting words. 
This standard was articulated in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, where fighting 
words were defined as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”56 The fighting words doctrine 
is justified by the argument that there is no value in communications that are 
considered fighting words, and whatever slight benefit that fighting words may 
have is substantially outweighed by societal interests.57 The belief is that the 
Constitution does not protect communications that are completely devoid of 
societal value (such as “epithets or personal abuse”) and therefore the 
punishment of those “fighting” words is not prohibited by the Constitution.58 
Courts have consistently held that when speech has absolutely no value, there 
is no justification for protecting it under the First Amendment, and it therefore 
can be restricted. However, this exception does not mean that the government 
can determine that the content of a certain expression has no societal value and 
thus restrict it; instead, it is limited to certain words and expressions that have 
traditionally been understood as having absolutely no value. 
Obscenity, the final traditionally recognized exception of the three, seems 
to be the exception most commonly reviewed by courts, especially in recent 
years.59 It is also the exception that is most relevant to this Note, as many 
proponents of violent video game regulation attempt to justify the legislation 
under the obscenity exception by encouraging the court to broaden the 
 
 53. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 54. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 55. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961). 
 56. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011); Miller v. United States, 
413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957); Am. Amusement Mach. 
Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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traditional definition of obscenity to include violent expression.60 The history 
of the obscenity exception is rooted in the belief that all ideas “having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance” are fully protected under the First 
Amendment—whereas obscenity has consistently been rejected as “utterly 
without redeeming social importance.”61 The Court in Roth v. United States 
established once and for all that obscenity is not constitutionally protected 
speech, and therefore, is an example of unprotected expression.62 In doing so, 
the Court limited the definition of obscenity to sexual materials.63 The Court 
noted, however, that sex and obscenity were not synonymous, and merely 
sexual material is not considered unprotected expression.64 Instead, for a 
sexually related expression to be characterized as obscenity, the material must 
deal with sex in a manner that appeals to prurient interest.65 Prurient is defined 
as “characterized by or arousing inordinate or unusual sexual desire.”66 
In 1973, in Miller v. California, the Supreme Court delineated a specific 
test for when a court should find that an expression is obscene.67 Since that 
time, courts attempting to determine whether an expression is obscene have 
applied this test:68 
a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests; 
b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value.69 
Therefore, it is fairly clear from the Miller obscenity test that the Court 
intended, at least initially, that the obscenity exception should be limited to 
sexually explicit materials and not expanded to include things such as violent 
expression. The Court affirmed this distinction in Winters v. New York, finding 
that a New York statute targeting publications depicting “bloodshed” was not 
unprotected expression, since it did not target any “indecency or obscenity in 
 
 60. Eric T. Gerson, Note, More Gore: Video Game Violence and the Technology of the 
Future, 76 BROOK L. REV. 1121, 1154 (2011) (arguing that the most common argument advanced 
by those who support violent video game legislation is for courts to expand the legal definition of 
obscenity to include violent video games). 
 61. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
 62. Id. at 485. 
 63. Id. at 485–86. 
 64. Id. at 487. 
 65. Id. 
 66. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (9th ed. 2009). 
 67. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 68. See, eg., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002). 
 69. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). 
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any sense . . . known to the law.”70 Since the work in Winters was violently 
explicit, but not sexually explicit, it did not qualify under the obscenity 
exception. The Court declined to broaden the obscenity definition to also 
include violent expression.71 Therefore, courts have consistently held that 
violent expression without a sexual component does not constitute obscenity 
and is consequently not unprotected expression, at least under the obscenity 
exception.72 
C. The Obscenity Exception as It Relates to Minors 
Basic free speech issues become further complicated when considering 
what material should be limited to minors versus what material should be 
limited to adults. The argument is that there is a different definition of what is 
appropriate for minors to view versus what is appropriate for the general adult 
public.73 In many situations, there is no difference between the two age groups 
in terms of dissemination as “the values protected by the First Amendment are 
no less applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to 
minors.”74 As a whole, First Amendment principles are generally applied 
consistently to adults as well as minors.75 However, there are cases when 
minors’ First Amendment rights are subjected to a different standard than those 
of adults.76 One such situation arises when the obscenity exception is 
implicated, as Mishkin v. New York indicates. Mishkin specified that the test for 
obscenity often must be adjusted for “social realities” in order to be “assessed 
in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient group.”77 
Applied to minors, this essentially means that when minors are the targeted 
group of a set of materials, the determination of what is obscene (and therefore 
excluded from First Amendment protection) must be altered in order to remain 
cognizant of the target audience. 
The Court in Ginsberg v. New York reaffirmed this principle by upholding 
a state statute prohibiting the sale of harmful materials to minors under 
 
 70. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1948). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992). The 
statute at question in this case was one that prohibited the rental or sale to minors of videos 
depicting violence. Id. at 686. The court noted that although what may be considered obscene is 
different depending on if the targeted audience is a minor or adult, obscenity nevertheless only 
covers expression that depicts or describes sexual conduct. Id. at 688. The court re-affirmed that 
obscenity does not include violence. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 (1975). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). 
 77. Mishkin v. United States, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966). 
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seventeen.78 There, the Court reiterated that laws targeting minors may be 
subject to a different standard, as states necessarily have more power to control 
the conduct of children than that of adults.79 Since “the well-being of its 
children is of course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to 
regulate,” the Court upheld the notion that a different definition of obscenity 
can be applicable when material is targeting children rather than adults.80 
Therefore, although obscenity has uniformly been held to only apply to 
sexually explicit materials, there is a precedent for the definition of “sexually 
explicit” to be broadened when applied to laws targeting minors. The key 
determination that courts must make in situations where the obscenity 
exception is implicated is whether or not the statute attempting to regulate 
obscene speech targeted at minors is narrowly enough tailored to protect a 
compelling interest of minors.81 
D. First Amendment Principles and Changing Technology 
A key First Amendment issue relating to this Note is the evolution of First 
Amendment principles in light of changing technologies. As technology 
becomes more and more advanced, courts are presented with the challenge of 
determining whether traditional First Amendment jurisprudence applies, or 
whether Constitutional principles must adapt to fit changing technology.82 In 
short, the issue is whether First Amendment doctrine should remain constant 
throughout time or adjust to reflect the realities of advancing technology. 
Courts have stressed that basic First Amendment principles remain the 
same, regardless of what technology or medium they are applied.83 In Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court was presented with the issue of whether 
motion pictures were protected by the First Amendment.84 In their 
determination that this was protected expression, the Court noted that the 
“basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First 
Amendment’s command, do not vary.”85 The Court noted that even if one were 
to accept the argument that movies possess a greater capacity for evil than 
other artistic mediums, it did not therefore follow that movies should be 
disqualified from First Amendment protection.86 Despite this broad rule, 
however, the Court did caution that on a micro level, the same “precise rules” 
 
 78. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633. The statute in question was New York Penal Law 484-h, 
which made it a crime for any person to sell or loan sexually explicit materials to a minor. Id. 
 79. Id. at 638. 
 80. Id. at 639. 
 81. Id. at 641. 
 82. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 502. 
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may not apply to every new type of medium, as each method of expression 
“tends to present its own peculiar problems.”87 Therefore, while taking a firm 
stance that basic First Amendment principles apply equally to all forms of 
technology, the Court also softened this stance by recognizing that each 
subsequent technological form would probably need to be evaluated on an 
individual basis to determine if the same First Amendment analysis could be 
applied. 
The recent case of United States v. Stevens, however, seemed to announce 
the general principle that First Amendment doctrine remains constant over 
time, even in light of technological advancement or changing mediums.88 In 
that case, the government attempted to justify legislation prohibiting filming 
animal cruelty by claiming that animal cruelty depictions are categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment.89 In support of this justification, the 
government argued that new categories of unprotected speech could be added 
via a balancing test, a contention that the Court declared “startling and 
dangerous.”90 The Court held that new categories of unprotected speech cannot 
simply be added by legislatures who find them overtly offensive—instead, the 
category must be rooted in traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.91 This 
distinction can also be applied to changing technologies when proponents 
argue that a new technology form may deserve a different First Amendment 
analysis.92 Therefore, the Court’s overall position has remained fairly clear: 
even though new technological challenges may arise, any restriction on free 
speech must nonetheless be justified under traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
E. First Amendment Principles Applied to Violent Video Games 
Although Brown was the first time the Supreme Court considered violent 
video game legislation, numerous lower courts had previously considered the 
 
 87. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 503. 
 88. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010). 
 89. Id. at 1584. 
 90. Id. at 1585. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Indeed, in the oral arguments of Brown, Justice Sotomayor made that very point. When 
questioning the attorney of the state of California about their argument to limit the sale of violent 
video games, Justice Sotomayor asked: 
  How is this any different than what we said we don’t do in the First Amendment 
field in Stevens, where we said we don’t look at a category of speech and decide that 
some of it has low value? We decide whether a category of speech has a historical 
tradition of being regulated . Now, other than some State statutes that you point to, some 
of which are very clearly the same as those we struck down in Wynn, where’s the 
tradition of regulating violence? 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No. 
08-1448), 2010 WL 4317136. 
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issue. Notably, the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had all previously ruled 
on questions very similar to the one faced by the Supreme Court in Brown. 
In American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, decided in 2001, the 
Seventh Circuit addressed the First Amendment implications of an 
Indianapolis ordinance seeking to limit minors’ access to violent video 
games.93 Specifically, the statute limited minors’ access to amusement 
machines exhibiting graphic violence, defined as a “visual depiction or 
representation of realistic serious injury to a human or human-like being where 
such serious injury includes amputation, decapitation, dismemberment, 
bloodshed, mutilation, maiming or disfiguration [disfigurement].”94 In finding 
that video game violence (and indeed, violence in general) does not fall within 
any of the recognized First Amendment exceptions, the court also addressed 
the argument that video games should be considered under a different free 
speech standard since they are so interactive.95 Judge Posner wrote, in what has 
since become a famous passage in violent video game/First Amendment 
controversies, “[M]aybe video games are different. They are, after all, 
interactive. But this point is superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature . . . is 
interactive; the better it is, the more interactive.”96 This passage from Judge 
Posner has been widely cited in cases and scholarly opinions related to the 
regulation of violent video games.97 Those who attack violent video game 
 
 93. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001). The 
ordinance at issue in the case sought to restrict minors’ access to amusement machines that 
predominantly appealed to minors’ “morbid interest in violence” or “prurient interest in sex” and 
that contained “graphic violence” or “strong sexual content.” Id. The court noted that only the 
“graphic violence” portion of the statute was at issue in this case. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 577. 
 96. Id. at 577. The full text of Posner’s argument reads: 
  Maybe video games are different. They are, after all, interactive. But this point is 
superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature (here broadly defined to include movies, 
television, and the other photographic media, and popular as well as highbrow literature) 
is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is successful draws 
the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge 
them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own. 
Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011); Clay Calvert, 
Violence, Video Games, and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the Defense of Kids’ Culture 
and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 12 (2002); Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games 
as a Protected Form of Expression, 40 GA. L. REV. 153, 192–93 (2005); Kevin W. Saunders, The 
Need for a Two (or More) Tiered First Amendment to Provide for the Protection of Children, 79 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 257, 264 (2004); Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex, Violence, and the First Amendment, 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857, 1870 (2007); Jennifer Chang, Note, Rated M for Mature: Violent Video 
Game Legislation and the Obscenity Standard, 24 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 697, 718 (2010); 
Gerson, supra note 60, at 1132; Ilana Lubin, Note, Challenging Standard Conceptions of 
Tradition, Science and Technology in 2006: Why Laws Prohibiting the Sale of Violent Video 
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legislation frequently cite this passage as evidence of the fact that video games 
are no more threatening than any other media form, and therefore, should not 
be subject to a different First Amendment analysis.98 Despite the fact that the 
court found the ordinance to be in violation of the First Amendment, however, 
the opinion noted that “a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a 
constitutional challenge.”99 Thus, the Seventh Circuit found this particular 
ordinance targeting video game violence unconstitutional, but it left open the 
possibility that more narrowly tailored statutes could be permissible, if the 
government could prove that there was a compelling interest justifying the 
restriction. 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit found in 2003 in 
Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County that an ordinance 
restricting the sale or rental of graphically violent video games to minors 
violated the First Amendment.100 In reaching this conclusion, the court wrote 
that to accept violent video game legislation as justified by a compelling 
interest “would be to invite legislatures to undermine the first amendment 
rights of minors willy-nilly under the guise of promoting parental authority.”101 
For video game legislation to succeed in the future, the court warned, 
governments must demonstrate with empirical studies and support that there is 
a link between playing violent video games and resulting harm to minors.102 
Absent that link, violent video game legislation violates the First 
Amendment.103 Thus, the Eighth Circuit’s major issue with the ordinance 
targeting violent video games was that it was simply unsupported by any 
documented evidence. 
As in the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of 
interactivity in video games. At the outset, the Eighth Circuit recognized that 
although violent themes are prevalent in many different entertainment 
mediums, “the interactive play of a video game might present different 
difficulties.”104 Ultimately, however, the court found that a similar level of 
interactivity may exist in movies (where you can choose to skip to certain 
scenes via a DVD menu or fast forward) or even choose-your-own-adventure 
series, and regardless, there is no justification for treating video games any 
 
Games to Minors Should be Ultimately Upheld, 13 Cardozo J.L. & Gender 173, 181 (2006); 
Robert Bryan Norris, Jr., Note, It’s All Fun & Games Until Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association and the Problem of Interactivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 
81, 97 (2011). 
 98. Calvert, supra note 97. 
 99. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 580. 
 100. Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 101. Id. at 960. 
 102. Id. at 959. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 957. 
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differently in a First Amendment analysis merely because they may be more 
interactive.105 
The Ninth Circuit most recently addressed the issue of violent video game 
legislation in its 2009 decision in Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, the appellate court decision later reviewed in Brown.106 The 
court addressed the government’s argument that they should apply a “variable 
obscenity” standard by first determining that video games are a protected form 
of speech, and then noting that the obscenity doctrine has never before been 
expanded to include violent content.107 Thus, the court applied strict scrutiny to 
the statute and held that it was not narrowly tailored to protect a compelling 
interest.108 It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit did not address the 
contention that video games present a unique First Amendment issue due to 
their interactivity. Although these three examples were not the only lower 
court decisions on the subject of violent video game legislation,109 they 
nonetheless were the most influential prior to Brown. In the wake of these 
decisions, the question was whether the Supreme Court would choose to rule 
upon violent video game legislation absent a conflict among circuits. In the 
case of Brown, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to rule on the issue of 
violent video game legislation.110 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Majority, Concurrence, and Dissents 
When presented with section 1746 of the California Civil Code, which 
banned the sale of violent video games to minors,111 the majority in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n struck it down as unconstitutional.112 The 
Court first held that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.113 
 
 105. Interactive, 329 F.3d at 957–58. 
 106. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 107. Id. at 957–58. 
 108. Id. at 967. 
 109. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n lists other 
cases striking down violent video game legislation as a violation of First Amendment, including: 
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2008); Entm’t Merchants Ass’n v. 
Henry, No. Civ-06-675-C, 2007 WL 2743097 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2007); Entm’t Software 
Ass’n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. 
Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp 2d 1051 
(N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir 2006); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 
F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004). Brief of Respondents at 1, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-
1448), 2010 WL 3535053. 
 110. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). 
 111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746 (2009). 
 112. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742. 
 113. Id. at 2733. 
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This was a point that received little debate, as even the proponents of the 
violent video game legislation recognized that video games as a whole are a 
medium deserving of First Amendment protection.114 Although the Court 
recognized the aforementioned unprotected speech exceptions (incitement, 
fighting words, and obscenity), it determined that this Act did not fall within 
any of those categories.115 Specifically, the Court was not persuaded that 
violent speech constituted obscenity.116 The government had argued that the 
Act targeted the “violence equivalent of sexual obscenity,” and since the 
determination of what was covered by the Act was structured similarly to the 
Miller three prong test, it should therefore be evaluated under the obscenity 
exception.117 To illustrate their point that violence was not considered 
obscenity, the majority detailed a long tradition of exposing children to 
violence in America, including Grimm’s Fairy Tales, The Odyssey of Homer, 
and the Inferno,118 concluding that minors’ access to violent speech has 
historically never been restricted via the unprotected speech exception.119 
Therefore, the Court determined that none of the unprotected speech 
exceptions were applicable to the California statute. 
The Court then addressed California’s argument that video games present 
special First Amendment problems due to their interactive nature.120 In 
response to this argument, the Court noted that all media is to some extent 
“interactive,” saying that “choose-your-own-adventure” stories are evidence of 
this fact (an argument that echoes the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ 
opinions).121 Despite the fact that video games may enable “participation” in 
ways that other media do not, the Court determined that was “more a matter of 
degree than of kind.”122 The majority then cited Judge Posner’s famous 
passage from Kendrick, noting that “all literature is interactive.”123 In total, the 
response to the argument that “video games present special problems because 
they are ‘interactive’” was limited to one paragraph in the overall opinion.124 
 
 114. Brief of Respondents at 17, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3535053 
(stating that “California has never contested that video games are expression entitled to First 
Amendment protection”). 
 115. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. 
 116. Id. at 2734. 
 117. Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 3, 7, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 
4034925 (noting that the Act’s terms were modified in Miller, although “the Act replaces 
‘prurient’ interest in sex with ‘deviant interest in violence’”). 
 118. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736–37. 
 119. Id. at 2736. 
 120. Id. at 2737–38. 
 121. Id. at 2738. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738. 
 124. Id. at 2737–38. 
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Having determined that the Act was an imposition upon an area of 
protected speech, the Court noted that it would be invalid unless California 
could prove that it was justified by a compelling government interest and that it 
was narrowly drawn to serve that interest.125 The Court held that no such 
interest existed, as the state’s evidence showing a connection between 
exposure to violent video games and harmful effects was not compelling.126 
Regardless, the Court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored since it 
was under-inclusive in the sense that it only excluded video games (and not 
other media forms such as literature or movies) and over-inclusive in the sense 
that it abridged First Amendment rights of children whose parents have no 
problem with violent video games.127 Therefore, the majority held that the 
statute was invalid since the First Amendment protects video games, the statute 
was an imposition on that protection, and California could not offer a 
justification for the imposition.128 Although the Court recognized that 
California was interested in solving a serious social problem, it nevertheless 
stressed that this piece of legislation was not the solution.129 
The concurrence, authored by Alito and joined by Roberts, agreed with the 
overall conclusion that the Act was invalid, but disagreed as to why.130 The 
concurrence found the statute invalid since it was impermissibly vague, with 
its terms not being fully defined and no distinction made between minors at 
different ages.131 One of the concurrence’s primary problems with the 
majority’s rationale focused on the majority’s hasty dismissal of the possibility 
that evolving technologies may require a different constitutional analysis than 
their less advanced predecessors.132 The concurrence based this criticism on 
the fact that the majority had failed to even consider the possibility that video 
games may present a different constitutional challenge than other mediums.133 
Specifically, the concurrence cautioned that “there are reasons to suspect that 
the experience of playing violent video games just might be very different 
from reading a book, listening to the radio, or watching a movie or a television 
 
 125. Id. at 2738. 
 126. Id. at 2738–39. The Court specifically found that the evidence offered by the state (that 
there is a link between violent video games and harmful effects in children) had been “rejected by 
every court to consider them, and with good reason.” Id. The Court noted that even assuming the 
studies were correct that there is a link, that link is very small and indistinguishable from the 
same problem in other mediums. Id. 
 127. Id. at 2740–42. 
 128. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741–42. 
 129. Id. at 2741. 
 130. Id. at 2742 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 2746. 
 132. Id. at 2748. 
 133. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2750 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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show.”134 The concurrence felt the majority had not devoted enough time or 
energy to evaluating this argument and to actually considering whether video 
games should be subjected to a unique First Amendment evaluation.135 
Alito and Roberts noted that the majority should have devoted more time 
to considering not only the interactive nature of video games being sold today, 
but also those that are likely to come in the future.136 As evidence of that point, 
the concurrence described current video games as “strikingly realistic” and 
“virtually indistinguishable from actual video footage.”137 In terms of the 
future, the concurrence cautioned that soon video games will cause a player to 
“experience physical sensations supposedly felt by a character,” such as “the 
splatting blood from the blown-off head.”138 The point of all this anecdotal 
support is that video games continue to rapidly evolve and may soon be at the 
point where they will be nearly identical to reality. The concurrence cited a 
brief from the International Game Developers Association (which, 
interestingly enough, was actually written in support of the respondents, 
Entertainment Merchants Association) stating that video games are “far more 
concretely interactive” than any other medium139—a conclusion the 
concurrence called “surely correct.”140 Despite this interactive difference 
however, the concurrence felt that the majority treated video games exactly the 
same as any other medium, a choice which may have been too hasty.141 
Overall, the concurrence concluded that this specific statute was invalid, but a 
statute serving the same interests may very well be constitutional if more 
narrowly tailored.142 
 
 134. Id. at 2742. 
 135. Id. The hesitation of the concurrence to automatically accept the majority’s conclusion 
that video games are exactly the same as other mediums is reflected in the oral argument 
transcript, as well. Chief Justice Roberts, who joined Justice Alito in the concurrence, questioned 
Mr. Smith (Attorney for Respondents Entertainment Merchants Association): 
What about—the distinction between books and movies may be that, in these video 
games, the child is not sitting there passively watching something; the child is doing the 
killing. The child is doing the maiming. And I suppose that might be understood to have a 
different impact on the child’s moral development. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 
4317136. Mr. Smith’s answer to Chief Justice Roberts’ question was that although there might be 
some difference, the State of California had not produced any evidence to that effect. Id. 
 136. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2748–49. 
 139. Id. at 2750 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae International Game Developers Association 
and Academy of Interactive Arts and Sciences in Support of Respondents at 3, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
2729 (No. 08-1448)). 
 140. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2750 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2748. 
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Justice Thomas’s dissent diverged from the issues present in the majority 
and concurrence. Thomas instead based his opinion on an originalism 
approach.143 Thomas wrote that as the First Amendment was originally 
understood, minors possessed no right to free speech; therefore, the Act cannot 
logically be constitutionally impermissible.144 To support this argument, 
Thomas detailed a long history of minors’ lack of a right to free speech, from 
the Puritans, to the Revolution, to the present day.145 Although Thomas’s 
dissent is quite lengthy, and probably worthy of a note solely analyzing only 
his position, his dissent will not be examined any further in this Note, as it is 
not relevant to the issues being examined herein. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, on the other hand, returned to the issues cited by 
both the majority and concurrence, finding that the statute was not 
impermissibly vague and was supported by a sufficiently compelling 
interest.146 In support of the compelling interest argument, Breyer detailed a 
long list of studies finding a link between violent video games and aggressive 
behavior in minors.147 Because of this link, Breyer argued that the restrictions 
on violent video games were valid.148 Breyer’s dissent concluded that the 
statute’s restriction upon free speech was “modest at most” and therefore found 
the California law constitutional.149 
B. The Aftermath of the Brown Decision in Terms of the Interactivity 
Argument 
Although the majority may be correct that video games as a whole are a 
medium deserving of First Amendment protection, one must nonetheless 
question whether the concurrence was correct in its criticism of the majority’s 
hasty dismissal of the interactivity question. The Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n decision has not been without its fair share of critics already, 
despite being less than a year old. For instance, recognized Supreme Court 
analyst Linda Greenhouse classified this case as the “[m]ost surprising 
decision” of the term.150 
 
 143. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2752–59. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 2771–79. 
 148. Id. 
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 150. Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court Scorecard, OPINIONATOR N. Y. TIMES BLOG (Jul. 
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Greenhouse argues that Brown was the most surprising decision of the term because of the 
general consensus among lower courts prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling. Id. Specifically, 
Greenhouse notes that usually when the Supreme Court acts “in the absence of a conflict among 
the lower courts,” they usually believe the lower court rulings are wrong and are seeking to 
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Was the majority too quick to dismiss the possibility that the increasingly 
interactive nature of video games means that they should be subject to a 
different First Amendment analysis than their less technologically advanced 
predecessors, such as television, books, and movies? Did the concurrence 
exercise the most prudent approach when evaluating the issue of violent video 
game legislation? A detailed review of scholarly opinions on the subject 
reveals that many scholars believe that the Brown majority erred in so quickly 
dismissing the possibility that the changing interactive nature of video games 
may lead to an evolving First Amendment jurisprudence.151 This vast body of 
scholarly work criticizing the majority’s viewpoint indicates that although the 
Supreme Court has now ruled on the issue, the debate over violent video 
games and First Amendment protection is far from over. 
C. The Argument for Protecting All Violent Video Games, Regardless of 
Interactivity 
Some commentators argue that the majority’s opinion (based on the line of 
lower court decisions preceding it) was exactly correct, and that video games 
should not be treated differently from other forms of media in a First 
Amendment analysis. Nearly all these opinions admit, however, that regardless 
of how the First Amendment treats the form, at some fundamental level, there 
may be a difference in the interactive level of video games and other medium 
forms. 
Clay Calvert, former Co-Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First 
Amendment at Pennsylvania State University, admits in his article Violence, 
Video Games, and a Voice of Reason, that there may be a “qualitative 
difference” between the violence in video games and that in other media.152 He 
argues that much of this difference may be attributable to the “participatory, 
interactive nature of video games.”153 Nonetheless, he calls the push for 
legislation regulating violent video games a “hysterical narrative.”154 His 
overall conclusion is that regardless of any “qualitative differences” that may 
exist between video games and other media, there is still no justification for 
 
correct them. Id. This opinion is supported by Respondent’s Brief in Opposition in Brown, which 
notes that “Petitioners offer no persuasive reason for the court to review this ruling. There is no 
split of authority on the questions presented. To the contrary, the lower courts are unanimous as 
to the constitutionality of bans on distribution of violent video games.” Brief of Respondents at 
12, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448), 2010 WL 3535053. It is perhaps best left to another to 
speculate as to why the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case when there was no circuit split 
and yet ultimately affirmed the lower courts. 
 151. See, e.g., Gerson, supra note 60, at 1139; Lubin, supra note 97, at 181; Chang, supra 
note 97, at 730. 
 152. Calvert, supra note 97, at 11. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 3. 
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intruding upon a minor’s First Amendment rights—a practice Calvert calls 
“one generation’s efforts to control both the culture and the cultural artifacts of 
another generation.”155 Thus, Calvert concludes that although there is a 
distinguishable difference in the interactive nature of video games as compared 
to any other media form, that difference is not relevant to First Amendment 
analysis. 
Abby Schloessman Risner grants in Violence, Minors, and the First 
Amendment that violent video games may present “a valid reason for concern,” 
although she nevertheless concludes that such concern does not lead to a 
change in First Amendment analysis.156 She notes that “the goal of protecting 
children from potential harm is not sufficient for denying speech protection 
under the First Amendment.”157 In Risner’s view, First Amendment concerns 
trump societal concerns. Thus, although the goals of violent video game 
legislation may be praiseworthy, opponents believe the First Amendment 
principles outweigh the goals. 
Luis S. Herrero Acevedo advances another argument for why violent video 
games should not be subject to a different First Amendment analysis in his 
comment Speech, Violence and Video Games.158 Herrero asserts that violent 
video game legislation, like attempts to stifle rock-and-roll and novels before 
it, is spurred on by generational conflicts, and the First Amendment exists as 
one of the few safeguards against this conflict—“to secure a long-lasting and 
strong cultural environment over temporary concerns.”159 Without the First 
Amendment, arguably, laws would constantly change to reflect cultural 
context. This opinion is supported by the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Cato 
Institute in Favor of Respondents, which claimed that the “interactive” 
argument against video games is not new, as each new technological form 
argued to have been an “exception” to First Amendment principles has 
attempted to have been justified by the “interactive argument.”160 As the Brief 
argued, “[C]ritics of cheap fiction and movies and radio and comics claimed 
that each of those new mediums presented a unique potential for harm . . . 
[but] . . . the only real difference is the method of depiction.”161 The Cato 
Institute argued that “some believe that video games more fully immerse the 
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user in the story . . . but all forms are, in one way or another, participatory.”162 
This generational conflict theory is one that was also argued by the 
Entertainment Merchants Association during oral arguments. Paul Smith, 
attorney for the Entertainment Merchants Association, stated that to accept the 
principle that a new medium automatically mandates a new First Amendment 
analysis is indicative of “a history in this country of new mediums coming 
along and people vastly overreacting to them, thinking the sky is falling.”163 In 
support of this assertion, Smith cites crime novels, comic books, movies, 
television, rock lyrics, and the internet as examples of new mediums that 
caused an uproar when first encountered.164 In short, proponents of this 
argument all feel that if a different analysis is applied to video games, it would 
not stop there. Instead, as each new and further technologically advanced 
media form comes along, there are those who will oppose it and demand it be 
exempt from First Amendment protection. 
Some supporters of video games even argue that the interactive nature of 
video games means they are a more valuable form of expression than other 
media forms. In their Brief of Amicus Curiae in Favor of Respondents, ID 
Software LLC argued that “to seek to deny protection to video games because 
of their interactivity mistakes a virtue for a flaw.”165 Instead of fearing video 
games because of their interactive component, legislators should praise video 
games, since, “as more than one court has recognized, expression is enhanced 
by interactivity.”166 As ID Software LLC points out, the interactivity as a 
virtue argument is actually judicially supported. The District Court of 
Connecticut, for instance, noted that “the nature of the interactivity . . . tends to 
cut in favor of First Amendment protection, inasmuch as it is alleged to 
enhance everything expressive and artistic” about video games.167 The brief of 
Entertainment Merchants Association also heralded the interactive nature of 
video games as a virtue, stating that “California fundamentally distorts bedrock 
First Amendment principles when it suggests that video games are entitled to a 
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lesser protection because their interactivity increases the impact of their 
expression on the viewer.”168 Thus, these sources all argue that video games as 
a whole should perhaps be even more deserving of First Amendment 
protection due to their creative and artistic benefits, which necessarily stem 
from the interactivity of the medium. 
Proponents of this argument further stress that contrary to the “alarmists” 
who seek to connect video games to school shootings, for instance, video 
games can actually have a beneficial social component. Jeffrey O’Holleran 
argues in Blood Code: the History and Future of Video Game Censorship that 
“a positive aspect of violent gaming exists: social interaction.”169 By engaging 
in multi-player games (through a mechanism such as Xbox Live), gamers may 
actually learn valuable social skills.170 Although social benefits must 
nonetheless be weighed against any potential drawbacks, this argument 
presents an interesting question in O’Holleran’s view: “Do the negative 
consequences outweigh the positive to the point of justifying extra 
regulation?”171 Considering that there might actually be positive benefits 
associated with playing video games (such as creative and social benefits), 
perhaps the majority was correct in finding that all violent video games are 
deserving of protection, regardless of the level of interaction inherent in the 
game. 
D. The Argument for a Potentially Unique First Amendment Analysis of 
Violent Video Games Due to Their Interactive Nature 
The opinions referenced above seem to be in the minority, however, as the 
majority of scholarship analyzing Brown and decisions like it finds that there is 
a notable difference between video games and other media forms; the majority 
therefore concludes (to varying extents) that video games should possibly be 
subjected to a unique First Amendment analysis, or at the very least, that the 
Court erred in dismissing that argument so quickly. The root of this argument 
is that there is a distinction between video games and other media forms that 
cannot be ignored, in that video games are almost “a fully immersive fantasy 
experience.”172 As a result, perhaps the concurrence in Brown was correct in 
finding that the majority too hastily dismissed the possibility that the evolving 
interactive nature of video games may require an evolving First Amendment 
analysis as well. A recent comment by James Dunkelberger analyzing the 
Brown decision concludes just that. Dunkelberger writes that the Brown 
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majority failed in not undertaking a more comprehensive analysis of video 
games, stating “Kendrick, Interactive Digital, and most recently, Brown, 
discount too quickly the wide range of game-play opportunities available to 
modern gamers.”173 The point is that courts may fail to truly understand just 
what playing a modern video game entails, and may therefore err in 
automatically applying existing First Amendment jurisprudence without 
further consideration. 
One argument in support of this proposition does not advocate for a new 
First Amendment jurisprudence but rather argues that violent video game 
legislation can be justified under existing constitutional jurisprudence, namely 
the unprotected speech doctrine. This argument stresses that although 
constitutional principles should remain fairly standard over time, they should 
nonetheless be flexible enough to evolve as technologies change. One 
proponent of this argument, Jennifer Chang, argues in Rated M for Mature that 
video game legislation could possibly be justified under the Miller obscenity 
exception, since “it is apparent that the Miller Court intended to allow the 
standard to evolve as community standards changed” and that obscenity 
standards must therefore evolve “alongside developments in technology that 
force society to face the reality of the virtual world it has created.”174 This 
argument stresses that the definition of obscenity should be flexible enough to 
reflect changes in technology, and therefore, as video games become more 
technologically advanced, courts should consider whether the definition of 
obscenity should also evolve. Patrick M. Garry, Professor of Law at University 
of South Dakota Law School, went even further than Chang and called the 
obscenity exception a “narrow pigeonhole exception,” arguing that now is the 
time to consider its modification.175 Ilana Lubin, writing prior to the decision 
of Brown, advocates a persuasive argument for expanding the Ginsberg 
decision to apply obscenity to video game violence. She essentially argues that 
although courts may have been correct in finding the interactivity argument 
unpersuasive in prior video games, more advanced games strain that analysis 
since they have become so realistic and depict human-like characters.176 These 
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authors seem to advocate that video games require a different First 
Amendment analysis than other media forms but argue that it should be rooted 
in existing jurisprudence such as the obscenity exception. 
However, as Eric T. Gerson explains in his article Video Game Violence 
and The Technology of the Future, although expanding the legal definition of 
obscenity to include video game violence is the argument most frequently 
advanced by proponents of regulation, it nonetheless is unlikely to occur, as 
the Court has consistently held that obscenity only applies to sexually explicit 
content.177 Since violence has consistently been viewed as entirely distinct 
from sexual content, it is unlikely that proponents who seek to regulate video 
game violence under the obscenity standard will be successful, regardless of 
the advances that may occur in technology.178 Thus, although this may be one 
of the most logical arguments for restricting violent video game speech, it 
nonetheless is likely to fail based upon historical precedence. 
Although obscenity is the most commonly cited existing category of 
unprotected speech for the regulation of violent video games, other proponents 
have argued that the increasingly interactive nature of violent video games 
possibly implicates the incitement exception as well.179 Pointing to 
increasingly interactive game systems such as Xbox Kinect (where the 
character’s action on the screen exactly mirrors that of the individual playing), 
the argument is that this type of technology moves the player into “actual 
facilitation of action” that is reminiscent of the incitement standard defined in 
Brandenburg.180 In short, this argument contends that the technological 
advances of video games may cause them to become a type of expression that 
constitutes incitement.181 To date, no court has considered whether 
participating in a video game rises to the level of incitement. However, based 
primarily upon courts’ treatment of video game legislation as being outside of 
the obscenity exception, this argument also seems unlikely to succeed. 
Additionally, incitement is a high standard to meet—the expression must 
essentially be demanding that individuals take action immediately. It seems a 
stretch to contend that the experience of playing a video game could command 
an individual to take action, but it is possible. 
In his note, Gerson offers other possible solutions to what he sees as an 
inevitability—that “current First Amendment jurisprudence on violent content 
in video games . . . will soon be outdated and irrelevant.”182 Gerson feels that 
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even if courts’ current treatment of video games is valid, it will quickly 
become obsolete as video games continue to progress.183 Among Gerson’s 
proposed solutions to this problem are a technological tipping point (where 
games that become so technologically advanced/fully interactive beyond a 
court-decreed point become removed from First Amendment protection),184 
states’ creation of more narrowly tailored statutes,185 or the creation of a new 
category of unprotected speech.186 Regardless of which of these approaches 
courts take, Gerson stresses this thesis: “the law must adapt to the changing 
technological climate.”187 These suggestions seem more viable than those 
propounded by scholars arguing to restrict video game speech under existing 
exceptions. Since courts have considered (and rejected) the argument that 
violent video games qualify for one of the existing unprotected speech 
exceptions, it seems logical to look for another solution, and Gerson’s 
suggestions seem practicable. 
Gerson’s conclusion that current video game jurisprudence may soon no 
longer be relevant is seconded by David Kiernan, who cautioned in 2000 that 
past video game decisions which were made in the “embryonic stages of video 
game development” could no longer be applied to the more sophisticated 
technology of video games in 2000.188 Imagine how much further video games 
have evolved in the past decade since those words were written, and Kiernan’s 
cautionary warning becomes even more potent. More recent scholarly work 
concurs with Gerson and Kiernan’s point as well. In his analysis of the Brown 
decision, David G. Post, Professor of Law at Temple University, challenges the 
reader as to whether “this particular crack (the conflict between violent video 
game legislation and the First Amendment) is truly sealed up or just papered 
over for the moment.”189 Robert Bryan Norris, Jr. offers a similar criticism of 
the Brown majority, simply stating “the Supreme Court has gracelessly glossed 
over the unique challenges presented by interactivity in video games.”190 
Gerson’s, Kiernan’s, Post’s, and Norris’s critiques of video game First 
Amendment jurisprudence (and the Brown holding, in particular) center on the 
fact that video games are constantly evolving and changing, and the suggestion 
that the courts’ unwillingness to take that factor into account may result in their 
decisions soon being rendered obsolete. 
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A great deal of the criticism of violent video game cases (including 
Brown’s majority opinion) centers on courts’ analyses of the interactive 
element of video games as comparable to that of literature and movies. This 
argument is perhaps best summarized by Judge Posner, who stated that the 
argument that video games should be subjected to a different standard is 
erroneous because “[a]ll literature . . . is interactive; the better it is, the more 
interactive.”191 Multiple scholars have dismissed this statement as overly 
simplistic. Kevin Saunders, Professor of Law at Michigan State University, 
says that “to say that literature is interactive because the reader empathizes 
with a character is a far cry from interactivity in the sense of participation in 
the action.”192 Saunders notes that Posner has confused two different types of 
interaction—literary interaction and actual participation in the action (such as 
in video games).193 Christopher Dean concurs with this point, asserting that the 
“interactive nature of video games” is a “unique characteristic that 
distinguishes it from other more innocuous forms of expression.”194 Indeed, to 
anyone who has watched a movie and then played a video game, the two 
experiences are undoubtedly quite distinct. The experience of passively 
watching a movie simply cannot rival actually participating in the action of a 
video game. 
That distinction turns specifically on the participatory features of a video 
game. As the state of California noted in its initial brief, “[T]he level of 
graphic detail and realism contained in many modern violent video games is 
without historical parallel.”195 When one plays a video game, they are involved 
in the “decision-making and carrying out (of) the violent act” which results in 
“a greater effect from violent video games than a violent movie.”196 In a 
shooting game, for instance, “you’re the one who decides whether to pull the 
trigger or not and whether to kill or not.”197 In short, you are not only watching 
the action. You are creating, experiencing, and responding to the action in a 
way that a passive viewer simply does not. 
But “pulling the trigger” is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how a 
gamer can participate in a game. In the Amici Curiae Brief jointly submitted 
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by twelve states, the details of a 2003 game entitled Postal were revealed.198 
The participatory actions in that game allow the player to do the following: 
“decapitate people with shovels and have dogs fetch their severed heads . . . 
urinate on people to make them vomit . . . [or] shoot players with a shotgun 
that has been silenced by ramming it into a cat’s anus.”199 The crucial point 
here is not just that these acts are shocking and appalling, though they certainly 
are. Instead, the problematic feature (from the viewpoint of proponents of 
violent video game legislation) is that the interactive nature of the video game 
allows the player to be the one actually choosing to engage in that action.200 
Although these examples come from just one game, there are numerous other 
games that contain similar, if not more shocking, actions that the player can 
engage in.201 It would be pointless (and repetitive) to detail all of the scenarios. 
The basic point is that these participatory features necessarily mean that video 
games affect the player in a very different way than movies or books may 
affect the watcher or the reader. 
Unfortunately, the issue is not just that video games are more interactive. 
Instead, it is the question of just what that interactive component may entail. 
Although disputed, substantial evidence exists indicating that this increase in 
interactivity also leads to an increase in behavioral problems. As Kevin 
Saunders points out, this correlation seems logical, as “the interactivity of the 
violent video game in which the player himself responds using virtual violence 
would seem more likely to lead the player to respond with violence in future 
situations than would simply viewing characters on a screen.”202 Saunders’s 
assertion is supported by empirical evidence. In their Brief of Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioners, California State Senator Leland Yee, the California 
Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the California 
Psychological Association noted the following: 
new data shows that the intensity of interactive video games may be 
habituating and that 2 to 3 hour sessions of intense interactions with video 
games raise adrenaline levels in children and produces extended physiological 
arousal. In the medical community concern has been raised at prolonged and 
regularly repeated states of adrenalized arousal and hyper-vigilance involved 
in children watching violent video games and the possible harmful effects on 
still developing bodies and brains.203 
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Despite these worries highlighted in this Amicus Curiae brief and numerous 
other similar studies, the majority essentially rejected all of the empirical 
evidence, instead noting that “these studies have been rejected by every court 
to consider them” since “[t]hey do not prove that violent video games cause 
minors to act aggressively,” but rather, at best show “some correlation.”204 
Breyer’s dissent challenged the majority’s assertion, arguing that there are 
“many scientific studies that support California’s views,” including “causal 
evidence that playing these games results in harms.”205 Breyer argued that the 
courts should defer to these experts, noting that “I, like most judges, lack the 
social science expertise to say definitively who is right. But associations of 
public health professionals who do possess that expertise have . . . found a 
significant risk that violent video games . . . are particularly likely to cause 
children harm.”206 Breyer critiqued the majority by stating “the majority, in 
reaching its own, opposite conclusion about the validity of the relevant studies, 
grants the legislation no deference at all.”207 Breyer also advocated for 
legislative deference during the Brown oral arguments, when he stated, “If I 
can say could a legislature have enough evidence to think there is harm, the 
answer is yes.”208 
Legislative deference is a key principle related to judicial decisions,209 so 
Breyer’s criticism of the majority is particularly apt. By substituting their own 
opinions for those of a legislature that has studied and examined congressional 
findings, the majority risks overstepping its own constitutional authority.210 
When a legislative body presents findings on a certain subject, courts are (to a 
certain extent) required to show the congressional body some level of 
deference.211 In the case of restricting speech to protect harms, the Supreme 
Court has stated that the appropriate level of deference is “to assure that, in 
formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on 
substantial evidence.”212 There clearly was an abundance of legislative 
findings in this case, as illustrated by Breyer’s dissent.213 Breyer attached to his 
dissent two appendices listing numerous studies demonstrating a link between 
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violent video games and psychological harm.214 As a justification for the 
appendices, Breyer notes that: 
[m]any . . . of these articles were available to the California Legislature . . . . I 
list them because they suggest that there is substantial . . . evidence 
supporting . . . (the conclusion) that violent video games can cause children 
psychological harm . . . [a]nd consequently, these studies help to substantiate 
the validity of the original judgment of the California Legislature.215 
Breyer’s point is that there seems to be extensive findings that the California 
Legislature relied upon in its creation of the statute in issue, and therefore the 
Court should have afforded the legislature its proper deference as the 
lawmaking body.216 Instead, the Court seemed to utterly disregard the 
legislative findings, or, at the very least, not find them worthy of serious 
credence. 
The petitioners’ Brief, however, argued that the causal connection the 
majority seemed to demand is simply an impossibility, since to test the 
proposition would be to require a study isolating a minor from all other kinds 
of violence while only subjecting them to violent video games.217 In light of 
the fact that this type of study is essentially an impossibility, the question 
becomes, what more evidence could the state of California have submitted that 
would indicate a compelling interest? This question is particularly relevant to 
those states that will continue to seek a way to regulate violent video games 
after the Brown decision. 
Perhaps the problem is that First Amendment protection should not 
automatically be extended to all new types of communication. Indeed, 
Professor Garry argues in his article Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age 
that “[i]f every new technology is automatically given First Amendment status, 
as seems to be the case with video games, then there is a risk that the First 
Amendment may become meaningless through an endless process of 
dilution.”218 Garry’s article was written prior to the decision of Brown, but its 
criticisms are easily applied to the majority holding in the case. Garry’s major 
problem with the courts’ treatment of violent video games is the precedent that 
it sets for even newer technologies that may emerge in the future.219 Garry 
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criticizes courts for automatically classifying each new technological 
advancement as protected speech and argues that courts should “actually 
examine the issue and come to some sort of modern definition of First 
Amendment speech.”220 Instead of actually analyzing each new technological 
medium, Garry argues courts automatically apply First Amendment 
protection—a knee-jerk reaction which may actually undermine the First 
Amendment.221 Garry seems to be correct that the majority’s opinion implies 
that regardless of the technological advancement, a new medium qualifies for 
First Amendment protection automatically. As Ken Paulson, President and 
CEO of the First Amendment Center, writes, “[T]he Supreme Court’s ruling 
[in Brown] is a vibrant application of 219-year-old principles to cutting-edge 
technology and asserts that any new forms of communication or media to come 
will be protected by the First Amendment.”222 As technology continues to 
advance, the Court should admit that a strict First Amendment jurisprudence 
may not be applicable, and should instead consider whether an updated First 
Amendment jurisprudence is warranted. 
Although this argument may be offensive to those who believe First 
Amendment law must remain constant, even in light of changing technologies, 
it is not without support from existing jurisprudence. Remember, for instance, 
what the Burstyn court cautioned back in 1952: although First Amendment 
principles remain the same over time, precise rules may need to be flexible, as 
each new type of expression “tends to present its own peculiar problems.”223 
Even the recent case of United States v. Stevens, which concluded that new 
categories of unprotected speech cannot just be added by legislatures who find 
them overtly offensive, was not dealing with changes in technology (just 
changes in cultural viewpoints).224 Perhaps evolving technologies (as 
illustrated by interactive video games) present the perfect impetus for the 
courts to reconsider (potentially) outdated First Amendment jurisprudence. The 
Brown decision may quickly become obsolete as newer video game 
technologies are introduced.225 Regardless, as the cursory rejection of the 
argument that the interactive nature of video games merits a further analysis 
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demonstrates, the Brown majority did not even consider whether video games 
present a unique First Amendment issue. 
E. Recommendations 
As argued by both the Alito/Roberts concurrence and the Breyer dissent, it 
seems the majority erred in so quickly dismissing the peculiar problems video 
games may present. After all, the Court disposed of California’s argument that 
“video games present special problems because they are ‘interactive’” in only a 
single paragraph.226 The comparison of a video game to a choose-your-own-
adventure novel, while not unfounded, seems overly simplistic. It seems almost 
absurd to contend that flipping to a certain page and discovering the fate of a 
character is comparable to feeling your finger on the trigger, focusing in on 
your target, pulling the trigger, and watching as he explodes. The majority of 
scholars agree, and rightfully so, that there are tangible differences between 
video games and other mediums—and those differences will only become 
more pronounced as video games continue to evolve. 
That difference is centered on the fact that when one plays a video game, 
one is not only involved in the action—one is creating it. And as video games 
become more advanced, one will not only be creating it, but will likely also be 
experiencing the action as well. “Rumble paks,” originally introduced in 1997 
for the Nintendo 64, allow the player to “feel” when he is shot or struck via a 
vibration in the controller.227 Now, the rumble feature is considered standard in 
video game systems.228 Rumble paks are a very rudimentary example of how 
the experience of playing a video game may be different from any other 
medium. The Xbox Kinect, released in just the past two years, is a further 
effort to attempt to integrate the player into the game.229 According to one of 
its developers, its purpose is “to remove the last barrier between you and the 
entertainment you love . . . [b]y making you the controller.”230 Each of these 
advancements is aimed at one ultimate goal: to eventually eliminate the 
distinction between playing a video game and experiencing it as real life. The 
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ultimate goal is to have the player forget he is playing a game and instead have 
the graphics and experience seem so real that he cannot tell where the game 
ends and reality begins. When that distinction is finally achieved, how can the 
majority’s opinion remain relevant? 
Based upon the vast body of scholarly work on the topic and the previous 
lower court decisions, it appears the concurrence took the most prudent 
approach in finding that, although this particular California statute may be 
impermissible, other statutes may prompt a reevaluation of First Amendment 
doctrine. Video games are rapidly evolving, a point which the majority 
essentially disregarded. Although the Court’s holding may be applicable to the 
current status of video games, it fails to account for any advances that may 
occur. Thus, the majority opinion may very soon become outdated and 
irrelevant. 
Those looking to regulate violent video games, however, would be well 
advised to search for another approach than the one taken by the California 
legislators in Brown. Judicial history has shown us that restrictions on violent 
video games are unlikely to succeed under an obscenity justification, or any 
other area of existing First Amendment jurisprudence. Instead, those seeking to 
regulate violent video games through legislation should consider justifying the 
restrictions under the cautionary standards advocated by the concurrence and 
the Breyer dissent. The argument that video games are more interactive than 
other media forms (and are therefore deserving of a unique First Amendment 
analysis) will only become more and more potent as video games continue to 
technologically advance. 
Perhaps the response to dealing with a “new” form of technology is having 
the courts consider a “new” kind of solution. In that vein, the best solution may 
be the one advocated by Eric T. Gerson—the technological tipping point 
approach.231 Under this analytical structure, any games that are so interactive 
beyond a court-determined “tipping point” would be removed from First 
Amendment protection.232 Although this approach would solve the interactive 
issue while still allowing less “threatening” video games to receive First 
Amendment protection, it is not without its drawbacks. One of the primary 
issues that could arise with this solution is the determination of what exactly 
constitutes the “tipping point.” Who would determine such a standard? How 
would courts apply it? Undoubtedly, this solution would necessarily entail a 
fairly subjective and murky body of jurisprudence. Furthermore, it does not 
solve the problem of attempting to justify the legislation under the obscenity 
exception, which courts have continually rejected. 
Perhaps the more workable solution is that statutes in the future must be 
more narrowly drawn and tailored to serve a compelling interest. This 
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argument is the one that courts have previously seemed the most receptive to; 
Posner concluded that “a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a 
constitutional challenge.”233 Even the majority itself in Brown (and certainly 
the concurrence) seems to agree that if the statute had been more narrowly 
constructed, it possibly could have passed constitutional muster (assuming a 
compelling interest could be shown). As Ilana Lubin wrote in 2006, although 
the California statute was “more specific” than its predecessors, that did not 
mean it would pass constitutional muster, but, “[i]t will only take one statute to 
pass muster, and the other states will inevitably follow suit.”234 In light of the 
fact that every court who has considered the issue has determined that violent 
video game legislation cannot be considered obscene, a statute that will satisfy 
the strict scrutiny analysis seems to be the most viable option for states who 
continue to seek a way to regulate the sale or rental of violent video games to 
minors. It seems unlikely that legislatures will simply stop trying to find ways 
to regulate violent video games after Brown.235 
Maybe the problem is that the scientific evidence has not quite advanced to 
the point where it can justify that compelling interest, which is a problem that 
may soon take care of itself as video games continue to increase in 
interactivity. Perhaps a more narrowly drawn statute, supported by more 
concrete empirical evidence, may eventually persuade the courts to reevaluate 
whether violent video games are deserving of First Amendment protection. 
Considering that the evidence in this case persuaded at least Justice Breyer 
(and possibly Justices Alito and Roberts also), more substantial scientific proof 
would likely persuade more judges that a substantial harm exists. 
Regardless of which approach courts may take in the future of First 
Amendment video game legislation, one thing seems fairly clear: even though 
the Supreme Court has issued a “final” ruling on the subject, the constitutional 
problems that violent video games present will continue to plague courts. 
CONCLUSION 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court grappled 
for the first time with the issue of whether violent video games deserve First 
Amendment protection. In a majority holding that has already proven 
controversial, the Court held that video games are protected speech, violent 
video games do not fall into any of the recognized unprotected speech 
 
 233. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 234. Lubin, supra note 97, at 185. 
 235. See Bruce Hausknecht, Dig Deeper: The First Amendment and Violent Video Games, 
CITIZENLINK (June 27, 2011), http://www.citizenlink.com/2011/06/27/dig-deeper-the-first-
amendment-and-violent-video-games (noting of Brown that “even though the decision is a 
disappointment for parents, it will give guidance for future efforts that California and other states 
may undertake to craft effective laws to protect children from violent material”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] LOSING THE GAME 491 
expressions, and the California statute could not be justified by a compelling 
interest.236 The concurrence dismissed the statute on due process grounds 
(finding the statute unconstitutionally vague), but simultaneously warned that 
the majority should have been more cautious in evaluating the special First 
Amendment problems presented by violent video games.237 Thomas’s dissent 
found the statute permissible under an originalist approach,238 whereas 
Breyer’s dissent found the statute permissible since it was supported by a 
compelling interest.239 
Although this holding was consistent with previous lower court holdings, 
many scholars have questioned whether the majority erred in barely even 
acknowledging that an argument could be made for a different constitutional 
standard for video games due to their interactive nature. Although some 
scholarship wholeheartedly supports the majority, most scholarship is more 
cautionary in nature, positing that the interactive nature of video games 
warrants some deeper constitutional analysis. In this respect, therefore, it 
appears that the majority erred in dismissing the interactive argument as out of 
hand, a criticism pointed out by the concurrence. 
Thus, although Brown gave lower courts a definitive answer on the issue of 
violent video game legislation, it nevertheless begs the question as to how long 
the decision may continue to be relevant. If experts are correct and video 
games advance to the point where it is nearly impossible to distinguish them 
from reality, the majority’s opinion may soon become obsolete. Empirical 
evidence may soon emerge demonstrating that as video games become more 
interactive, the dangers they pose to children increase as well. At this point, 
such a link remains speculative. Either way, it is clear that in spite of the 
Supreme Court finally ruling on the issue, the controversy surrounding violent 
video game legislation is far from over. 
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